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Multi-Level Governance in Hitler’s Germany: 
Reassessing the Political Structure of the  
National Socialist State 
Thomas Schaarschmidt ∗ 
Abstract: »Mehrebenenverwaltung im Nationalsozialismus: Eine Neubewer-
tung der politischen Struktur des NS-Staats«. To explain the fatal efficiency 
and relative stability of the Nazi dictatorship, it is necessary to analyze how 
governmental institutions and society at various levels of the political system 
interacted. Contrary to the expectation that polycratic structures hampered 
administrative efficiency and tended to undermine well-established political 
structures it turns out that new models of governance evolved from the chaot-
ic competition and short-lived cooperation of traditional administrations, party 
structures and newly created special institutions. While key players on the na-
tional level claimed to control lines of command from top to bottom the 
adaptability of the whole system to new challenges depended to a large extent 
on complex and often improvised arrangements of multi-level governance. 
During the war these arrangements served to integrate and to mobilize all po-
litical, administrative, military, economic and social forces whose resources 
were essential to sustain the war effort of the Nazi leadership. 
Keywords: Mobilization, Gau, decentralization, Reich Defense Commissioners, 
polycracy, multi-level governance, Nazi Germany. 
1.  Introduction 
The months of air war have doubled and trebled the powers accumulated [at] the  
regional level. Decisions can no longer be centrally made and enacted. The  
decentralization of [political action] and even of policymaking is vital  
in order to cope with the terrific problems created by bombing.  
(Neumann 1944, 537) 
Franz Neumann’s description of the disorder caused by Allied bombing contra-
dicts our traditional view of the Nazi state as a tightly controlled and highly 
centralized totalitarian system. Neumann, a German sociologist and US émigré 
who wrote the book Behemoth in exile, describes how the Nazi state underwent 
a process of increasingly greater decentralization in the latter years of the war. 
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He concludes that regional leaders, acting with a great deal of autonomy, were 
successful in many respects in dealing with the effects of the Allied bombing 
campaigns (Neumann 1944, 537). 
In a similar vein, Peter Hüttenberger discusses in his 1969 study the in-
creased powers enjoyed by the Gauleiter in the latter stages of the war (Hüt-
tenberger 1969). Until the 1990s, the prevailing view was that mid-level au-
thorities in the Nazi state were in constant conflict with each other, until 
complete chaos broke out in the final stage of the war. Thus Hans Mommsen 
argued government action collapsed into a “chain of ad hoc decisions shaped 
by personal bias,” and the state degenerated into “an amorphous ensemble of 
different fiefdoms, held together solely by loyalty to the Führer and parallel 
administrative structures.” In this way, the regime was “well on its way to 
collapsing into disparate regional authorities headed by jealous and mistrustful 
leaders who used violence as their primary tools of control” (Mommsen 2000, 
237). From this perspective, it is perhaps surprising that the Nazi state perse-
vered for as long as it did, collapsing only in the face of overwhelming Allied 
strength (Ruck 2011, 77-9). 
This paper analyzes Nazi Germany from a novel perspective, drawing on the 
theoretical model of “multi-level governance” as an interpretive tool. In partic-
ular, the paper addresses the following questions: (1) What arrangements de-
veloped between actors and organs at various levels of the political system? (2) 
Were the horizontal and vertical structures of Nazi Germany’s multi-level 
governance system circumvented by instances of “scale jumping”? (3) What 
effects did these phenomena have on the overall system? In answering these 
questions, I seek to determine whether the multi-level governance model, 
which is primarily used to analyze international policy coordination (Hooghe 
and Marks 2010, 17-31), is useful for understanding the functional mechanisms 
of the Nazi state. 
As Neumann described, in the second half of the war, as the pressures on the 
home front grew considerably more intense, the individual administrative re-
gions within Nazi Germany, known as Gaue, gained increasing powers. Thus, 
in our application of the multi-level governance approach, we must take tem-
poral factors into account, for they are crucial to understanding how the rela-
tionship between various levels of the Nazi regime changed over time (Nolzen 
2012, 243). Spatial factors are another important consideration, for Raum in the 
sense of “space” or “territory” was a key concept for the National Socialists. 
Indeed, overturning the post-WWI political order and establishing German 
hegemony over continental Europe through force of arms were goals that Ger-
many’s political leadership had been single-mindedly pursuing since 1933. 
German plans for the integration of the conquered Eastern territories were 
based on the ideas formulated for the political and spatial restructuring of areas 
that already belonged to Germany. However, even prior to the outbreak of war, 
the Reich’s Raumplaner, or “spatial planners,” came into conflict with military 
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officials (Leendertz 2008, 110), who primarily viewed geographic space as a 
potential venue for armed conflict (Nolzen 2012, 247-52). 
Smaller regions and districts within the Nazi state were not only relevant as 
the recipients of policies formulated from above. The Nazis regularly invoked 
the notion of Heimat, or homeland, to build legitimacy for their rule and mobi-
lize the civilian population. In doing so, they leveraged stereotypical portrayals 
of German identity that were popular among the nationalistic right. In this way, 
the small-scale, local levels of the state became important epicenters for “grass-
root” displays of loyalty to the Nazi movement and the dissemination of propa-
ganda. This active support from below was crucial for the implementation of 
political objectives decided at a central level (Steber 2010, 418). Accordingly, 
the exercise of power in Nazi Germany was subject to an ongoing process of 
reconciliation between actors who occupied different levels of the system, and 
who were regularly animated by divergent interests. 
Over the past two decades the relationship between German society and its 
political leadership during the Nazi era has undergone a significant reassess-
ment. Prior to the 1980s, the dominant view was that the German populace 
primarily “reacted” to the impositions of the regime, whether through re-
sistance, acquiescence, or approval (Broszat and Fröhlich 1978, 11-73). How-
ever, recent research has explored the reciprocal relationships that existed 
between the apparatus of Nazi rule and society, investigating how interactions 
between “top down” and “bottom up” processes shaped the overall system. 
This method of investigation exhibits strong similarities to the multi-level 
governance model, as both approaches analyze how societal and para-
governmental actors participated in the political system.  
The first part of this paper examines the early years of the Nazi regime and 
seeks to identify the structural factors that subsequently contributed to decen-
tralization. The second part of the paper examines how the Four Year Plan, 
Aryanization, and cultural propaganda influenced the shifting power relation-
ships in the Nazi regime’s multi-level political system. The third part of the 
paper looks at the various models of governance, described as Neue Staatlich-
keit (Hachtmann 2007, 56-79), that were particularly important for governing 
the new territories added to the Reich after 1938. In the final section I draw on 
the multi-level governance model as a tool for explaining the complex interac-
tions that took place at various levels of the political system and the resilience 
of the regime in the second half of the war. 
2.  Hierarchical Confusion in Nazi Germany 
The term Gleichschaltung, which eventually came to refer to the Nazification 
of all aspects of society, was originally used in 1933 to refer to the consolida-
tion of the regime’s control over Germany’s federal states, or Länder. In this 
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way, Gleichschaltung initially referred to the destruction of the country’s tradi-
tionally strong federal system which had been adopted during German unifica-
tion in 1871. During the Weimar Republic, the powers of Germany’s states had 
in fact been on the decline, particularly following Erzberger’s financial reforms 
of 1919-20, the central government’s interventions against the governments of 
Thuringia and Saxony in 1923, the practice of governing without parliamentary 
support, and the Preußenschlag of July 20, 1932. Nevertheless, as the Nazis 
came to power in 1933, Germany’s federal system of government remained 
relatively decentralized, as the Weimar constitution guaranteed the states vari-
ous rights and powers. 
The National Socialists exploited Germany’s federal structure in order to 
gain power in 1933. Following the “Second Gleichschaltung Act” of April 7, 
1933, it became clear that Adolf Hitler’s new regime sought to establish a 
highly centralized state. Immediately after the Reichstag elections on March 5, 
1933, Germany’s state governments were replaced by “commissionary repre-
sentatives" from the NSDAP and SA. The Second Gleichschaltung Act then 
dictated the installation of Reich Governors (Reichsstatthalter), who were 
invested with broad authority to supervise the work of the state governments 
(Ruck 2011, 86). The Reich Governors, who were appointed by the Reich 
President based on Hitler’s recommendation, were authorized to assume chair-
manship of state cabinet meetings, without actually belonging to the state gov-
ernment. In the Prussian provinces, the newly installed Oberpräsidenten were 
invested with the same authority, and like the Reich Governors, were selected 
almost without exception from the ranks of the National Socialist Gauleiter. 
With the replacement of Germany’s state governments with Nazi loyalists 
and the subsequent installation of the Reich Governors, the Nazi leadership had 
launched a successful two-pronged attack against the intermediate level of the 
political system. Then, on January 30, 1934, the final remnants of German 
federalism were swept away with the adoption of the Act on the Reconstruction 
of the Reich. Article 2 clearly states: “(1) The sovereignty rights of the states 
are transferred to the Reich. (2) The state governments are subordinate to the 
Reich government.” With the stroke of a pen the Reich Governors were sub-
sumed under the authority of the Reich Interior Minister. While the state gov-
ernments remained in place, they were transformed into mere administrative 
agents of the central government. In this way, even before key areas of gov-
ernment, such as the police and the judiciary, were fully centralized, a new 
political system was established that allowed Reich Ministers to ensure that 
Berlin’s policy decisions were enacted down to the regional level (Minuth 
1983, 1105). 
Given this expansion of the Reich Ministers’ authority, what was the future 
role of the Reich Governors? Were they to merely communicate to the state 
governments the directives issued by the Reich Ministers, as foreseen under 
paragraph 3 of the Reich Governor Act of January 30, 1935? Or were they 
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instead to assume leadership of their respective states, as provided for under 
paragraph 4? If the former mode of governance had been implemented, there 
would have been a continuous and direct chain of authority, with decisions 
made by the central government filtering down to the regional level through the 
Reich Governors. Yet the precise authorities invested in the Reich Governors 
were unclear. As Adolf Wagner, the Bavarian Interior Minister and Gauleiter 
of Munich-Upper Bavaria, critically noted in June 1934, it would have been 
more logical to eliminate the Reich Governors, State Minister Presidents, and 
State Ministers and replace them with local offices that represented the central 
ministries in Berlin (Minuth 1983, 1346). 
Ultimately, only Jakob Sprenger in Hesse, Martin Mutschmann in Saxony 
and Karl Kaufmann in Hamburg availed themselves of paragraph 4 (Hütten-
berger 1969, 91). The Gauleiter in Saxony and Hamburg invoked paragraph 4 
in an effort to enhance their authority. Paragraph 4 enabled Mutschmann to 
prevail in the power struggle against his rival Manfred von Killinger, who had 
been appointed Saxon Minister President in 1933. Karl Kaufmann, for his part, 
laid the foundation for the establishment of the “Reichgau” of Hamburg (Lo-
halm 2005, 138). In some cases, there was a mismatch between a Gauleiter’s 
governmental duties and his territorial authority. For example, Alfred Meyer, 
the Gauleiter of Westphalia-North, was named the head of the district of Lippe 
in 1936, and was appointed Oberpräsident of Westphalia two years later. This 
led to overlapping and unclear territorial authority, in contrast to the intentions 
of the Reich Governor Act of 1935, as the Gau of Westphalia-South remained 
independent until 1945.  
For various reasons the Reich Interior Ministry’s reorganization of the coun-
try’s multi-level political system ran into difficulties in the mid-1930s. On the 
one hand, there was an inherent contradiction in Hitler’s assertion that Reich 
Governors should act as “public authorities who advance the National Socialist 
cause,” yet not as “administrative authorities” (Mommsen 2000, 230). Underly-
ing this statement was the assumption that the inspirational leadership of the 
Nazi regime was superior to administrative procedure, and that high-ranking 
party officials were not fulfilling their political role if they became immersed in 
bureaucratic detail.1 Indeed, Hitler hoped to counteract the ossifying effects of 
established administrative routine with flexible leadership structures. His aim 
was to keep the political system flexible and dynamic, thus maximizing the 
regime’s ability to mobilize the populace (John 2007, 47-8). It was for this 
reason that the paragraph 4 of the Reich Governor Act referred to powers that 
“could” be invoked on an optional basis (Ruck 2011, 87-8). 
On the other hand, the Reich Governors had a privileged role within the re-
gime, as they were personally appointed by Hitler. Their status would have 
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been crucially undermined if they had been made subordinate to the bureau-
cratic apparatus. As regional representatives of the party, they viewed their 
standing as equal to that of the Reich Ministers, despite their duty to obey the 
orders issued by the latter (Minuth 1983, 1228). In a letter of June 23, 1934, to 
Wilhelm Frick, Adolf Wagner described how the new political arrangements 
could lead to confused lines of authority:  
According to current law, the Reich Governors are subordinate to you [viz. 
Frick] in your position as Reich Interior Minister. Adolf Hitler is the Reich 
Governor of Prussia. He has delegated his rights to the Prussian Minister Pres-
ident. However, you are also a Prussian Interior Minister. As Reich Interior 
Minister, Adolf Hitler and the Prussian Minister President are thus your sub-
ordinates. As you are also the Prussian Interior Minister, you are in turn sub-
ordinate to the Prussian Minister President and yourself as Reich Minister. I 
am not a jurist and also not a historian, but I believe this constellation is a rare 
thing indeed. (Minuth 1983, 1347)  
The confusion between the various levels of authority, which Wagner de-
scribed as an “untenable set of arrangements, at the highest level of the Reich,” 
generated a host of insoluble political conflicts. 
By contrast, the German Municipalities Act of January 30, 1935 eschewed 
the establishment of unclear lines of authority (Gruner 2011, 178-80). The 
political structures of local government were defined in great detail by the Act, 
including the specific authority of the mayor and council members. The Ger-
man Municipalities Act also provided for local government to be supervised by 
the Reich Interior Ministry, dictating that an “NSDAP representative” – typi-
cally the Nazi party’s Kreisleiter (County Leader) – was to be involved in local 
deliberations and decision-making (Hirsch, Majer and Meinck 1997, 165-9). 
The measure, which was designed “to complete the organizational rebirth of 
the Reich,” referred to the simultaneous efforts being made by the Reich Interi-
or Minister to regulate responsibilities of the states and Gaue. In real terms, 
however, there was a yawning gap between the clear reorganization of political 
authority undertaken at the local level, and the blurry demarcation of authority 
prevailing at higher levels of the political system.  
Thus, while the National Socialists destroyed German federalism within two 
years of taking power, the replacement system they instituted was a confused 
patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions. On the one hand, the Act on the Recon-
struction of the Reich, the absorption of almost all Prussian ministries by their 
national counterparts, as well as the subordination of key institutions, such as 
the judiciary and the police, to the central government created an extremely 
centralized order. On the other hand, this new order coexisted with state minis-
ters, state chancelleries, and Reich Governors whose authorities remained 
poorly defined, despite the calls made by prominent individuals, such as Adolf 
Wagner, for a more clearly defined political structure. Although the Gleich-
schaltung Acts ostensibly provided for a clear assignment of responsibilities, 
they actually enabled regional party leaders to consolidate and expand their 
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authority, even if they did not make use of paragraph 4 of the Reich Governors 
Act (Ruck 2011, 96-7). 
Accordingly, we should not take the complaints made by the Gauleiter con-
cerning the difficult position occupied the Reich Governors at face value. 
When Fritz Sauckel, the Gauleiter of Thuringia, wrote in a memorandum at the 
end of January 1936, “the position of the Reich Governors [was] actually more 
threadbare than that of the State Ministers” (Hüttenberger 1969, 114), he had 
already made considerably headway in expanding his power base, successfully 
subsuming various governmental functions under the authority of the Reich 
Governor’s Office (John 2002, 43-4). 
It was during this time that local leaders in Saxony developed plans for a 
“Gau government.” To some extent, these plans corresponded with the efforts 
of the Reich Interior Ministry to create intermediate levels of the bureaucracy 
resembling Prussia’s District Presidents (Regierungspräsidenten) in order to 
consolidate intermediate-level administrative functions (Ruck 2011, 92). These 
efforts sought to counteract the growing power of the Reich Ministries in Berlin, 
who began to intervene directly in the affairs of their state-level counterparts, 
thus sidestepping the Reich Governors, who were the intended supervisors of 
state-level activities (Schrulle 2008, 178-9). In 1935, the Reich Interior Minister’s 
attempt to depose the presiding Minister Presidents in order to appoint Reich 
Governors in their stead was successful in Saxony and Hesse, but failed in 
Württemberg, Baden, and Thuringia. Sensing a unique window of opportunity, 
the Gauleiter of Saxony, Martin Mutschmann, expanded the powers of the 
Saxon State Chancellery, turning it into a control center with power over a 
range of party and state functions (Wagner 2004, 365-75; Schaarschmidt 2007, 
131-2). In this way, as demonstrated by the events in Saxony, the initial reorgani-
zation measures undertaken by the Reich Interior Ministry, and its subsequent 
efforts to rectify unclear lines of authority, furnished the Reich Governors with 
opportunities to consolidate and expand their powers at the intermediate level 
of government within the otherwise highly centralized regime. 
3.  The Limits of Centralization 
As there was no unified organizational framework in the middle of the 1930s to 
guide the development of power structures in Germany’s states and Gaue, the 
freedom of action enjoyed by Reich Governors and regional officials and their 
ability to engage in scale jumping depended heavily on individual initiative, 
interpersonal relationships, and the specifics of existing organizational ar-
rangements at the local level. Germany’s Reich Governors were similar to the 
Prussian Oberpräsidenten in that both held a governmental as well as a party 
office. As Gauleiter, they were personally appointed by Hitler, and were part of 
the highest leadership circle within the Nazi regime. Accordingly, the preamble 
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to the Act on the Reconstruction of the Reich states explicitly that “matters that 
fall under the purview of the Reich Governors in their function as Gauleiter are 
not to be subject to decision by the Reich Interior Minister; rather, they are to 
be judged by the responsible NSDAP authorities.”2 In this way, the Reich Gov-
ernors were partially subordinate to the Reich Interior Ministry, yet they were 
also placed on equal footing with the Reich Ministers and Reichsleiter (heads 
of central party offices). The joint conferences held for the Gauleiter and 
Reichsleiter – the last of which took place in Hitler’s bunker in February 1945 
– were a testament to the stature of the Reich Governors (Moll 2001, 215-73). 
Yet despite their standing within the regime, their ability to influence policy 
as regional party leaders was initially quite limited. This was because they were 
a part of a highly regimented, vertical power structure that encompassed all 
Gau offices, regional party chapters, and related associations (Hüttenberger 
1969, 120-3). Yet perhaps an even larger problem was that all party budgets 
were centrally supervised by Reich Treasurer Franz Xaver Schwarz (Hirsch, 
Majer and Meinck 1997, 286). When Martin Mutschmann, the Gauleiter of 
Saxony, threatened in September 1935 to resign from office if he was not given 
sole responsibility for his Gau’s finances, he quickly learned that the Reich 
Treasurer was not to be meddled with. Schwarz categorically rejected Mutsch-
mann’s ultimatum. In a letter to Rudolf Hess, Schwarz asked him to  
inform party member [“Pg.”] Mutschmann that his behavior is inappropriate 
[...] that he should refrain in the future from intervening in my affairs. As a 
Gauleiter, Mutschmann should practice far greater restraint when criticizing 
the policies of the Reichleitung [central party leadership].  
He also added:  
If Mutschmann believes that he has created the financial basis for his Gau by 
virtue of his good name, then this is an expression of arrogance. He did not re-
ceive the money as Mr. Mutschmann, but rather as the Gauleiter of the 
NSDAP Gau of Saxony. (Schaarschmidt 2004, 154) 
Mutschmann’s battering ram strategy was thus a failure. Other Reich Gover-
nors took a quieter approach, establishing hidden accounts and slush funds that 
gave them substantial leeway for their own financial decision-making (Hütten-
berger 1969, 130). In this context, the dispossession of Jewish firms proved to 
be particularly profitable, not least because it was legitimated by the National 
Socialist policy of Aryanization. In a very early example of dispossession, the 
Gauleiter of Thuringia, Franz Sauckel, managed to bring the Simson arma-
ments works in Suhl under his control just two years after the Nazis came to 
power. The Jewish owners of the Simson works – which became a major site of 
armaments production during the war – were not just driven into financial ruin 
during a lengthy trial; they were ultimately forced to flee the country. The 
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Wilhelm Gustloff foundation, based on the Simson works, was controlled by 
Sauckel and included various other companies by the end of the war (John 
2002, 42; Bartuschka 2011). 
From the early 1930s onward, the radicalization of Nazi policy toward the 
Jews was often driven by initiatives taken at the lower and intermediate levels 
of the party. This was evident in the wake of the boycott of Jewish businesses 
in April 1933. Anti-Jewish activities proliferated at the local level, reaching a 
crescendo in the middle of 1935 (Ahlheim 2011, 283-99). As a consequence, 
while the process of Aryanization was still in a nascent phase at the national 
level, it was already complete in many cities and districts, such as in the free 
state of Schaumburg (Werner 2010, 521-83). One can hardly speak of a centrally 
directed policy when one considers how initiatives at various levels of the 
political system reinforced one another in a reciprocal fashion. While the Reich 
leadership clearly set the tone with its anti-Semitic measures in 1933, local 
party activists seized the initiative with various concrete measures against the 
Jewish populace. This, in turn, placed the national leadership under pressure to 
adopt even more radical measures, such as the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 (Wild 
2007, 281-2). 
As the Aryanization wave of the second half of the 1930s rose in intensity, a 
number of Gauleiter, following Sauckel’s example, sought to ensure that their 
regional party organizations would profit from the dispossession of the Jews. 
The party officials in the Gaue of Munich-Upper Bavaria and Middle Franco-
nia proved to be particularly covetous of Jewish property (Drecoll 2009, 54). 
Julius Streicher and Adolf Wagner were among the oldest Nazi party loyalists. 
In a departure from the policy that was implemented in other non-Prussian 
states, none of the four Bavarian Gauleiter had been appointed to the position 
of Reich Governor; instead, Hitler selected the Freikorps commander Franz 
Xaver von Epp. Epp’s position remained weak, however, as he was marginal-
ized by the four Bavarian Gauleiter, who based their authority on a combina-
tion of party and state offices. Adolf Wagner, who was appointed Interior Min-
ister of Bavaria in 1933, also held the post of Bavarian Cultural Minister from 
1936 onward. As the head of the Gau of Munich-Upper Bavaria – a traditional 
stronghold of the Nazi party – he also enjoyed excellent ties to influential per-
sonalities in central party and state offices (Drecoll 2009, 52-3). Wagner and 
his Bavarian colleagues were thus accustomed to circumventing traditional 
lines of authority by scale jumping when pursuing their interests. 
Immediately after the pogroms of November 1938, Wagner created a com-
pany under his management that served as a hive-off vehicle for confiscated 
Jewish property. As he subsequently came into conflict with officials who 
asserted that the Reich had the exclusive right to take control of Jewish proper-
ty, he changed course in September 1939, tasking an “Aryanization office” 
with expropriating the Jews. However, this office was directly subordinate to 
him as the Bavarian Interior Minister. In its first year of operation, the Aryaniza-
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tion office in Munich generated over 700,000 Reichmarks (Drecoll 2009, 69-73). 
Wagner’s counterpart in Franconia, Julius Streicher, believed the confiscation of 
wealth through Aryanization should be used to finance the party organization at 
the Gau level, and he acted accordingly. However, in the wave of expropriation 
that swept Germany after November 9, 1938, Streicher and his allies were 
somewhat overzealous in their efforts to personally enrich themselves. This 
motivated Steicher’s competitors at the regional level to lodge complaints with 
high-ranking party officials (Drecoll 2009, 81-3). Thus, while Streicher under-
mined his political standing, other Gauleiter, including Sauckel and Wagner, 
managed to amass considerable funds on accounts they controlled.  
In the second half of the 1930s there were two additional fields of political 
activity that offered opportunities for advancement: cultural policy and rearm-
ament policy. From 1933 onward a variety of institutions intervened in cultural 
life at the regional level, including the Reich Education Ministry, the Reich 
Propaganda Ministry, and the Reich Chamber of Culture, among other cultural 
associations closely linked to the Nazi party. This provided local political offi-
cials with a range of options for expanding their influence (Schaarschmidt 
2004, 38-47, 66-71). Involvement in cultural affairs was enticing for good 
reason: on the one hand, it allowed party functionaries at the regional and local 
level to publically portray themselves as a “men of the people.” On the other 
hand, it was a useful vehicle for rallying support among local members of the 
public who were otherwise lukewarm to the Nazi cause (Steber 2007, 142-3). 
Lower level officials’ cultural activities were welcomed by the party leader-
ship, as long as the celebration of regional difference did not undermine the 
effort to establish a unified, pan-German cultural front (Dahm 1995, 221-65). 
In the Bavarian region of Swabia, where a cultural association close to the 
party had existed since 1933, the Gauleiter Karl Wahl propagated a National 
Socialist vision for society that was tailored to a Swabian audience. Wahl in-
voked traditional aspects of Swabian culture and fused them with the more 
palatable aspects of National Socialism, thus creating a form of pro-Nazi prop-
aganda that was less divisive, but which ultimately stood for the same social 
and political goals (Steber 2010, 406-7, 418). Wahl’s activities aimed at attract-
ing prominent individuals at the local and regional levels to the Nazi cause in 
order to demonstrate the party’s cultural superiority (Steber 2010, 373). 
The Saxon Gauleiter Martin Mutschmann was another party official who in-
strumentalized local culture and regional traditions in order to serve the ends of 
the Nazi leadership. The Nazi cultural propaganda in Saxony experienced a 
massive proliferation from 1936 onward, and soon enveloped nearly all cultural 
associations. Founded as a cultural association, the Heimatwerk Sachsen was 
under the full control of Mutschmann. He successfully harnessed the Gau party 
organization, the regional offices of the NSDAP, and affiliated associations for 
his propaganda efforts. By fending off central intrusions into regional cultural 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  228 
affairs Mutschmann used the organization to enhance his sphere of influence 
(Schaarschmidt 2004, 99-274). 
The head office of the Heimatwerk was installed in the Saxon State Chan-
cellery, demonstrating to which extent state and party functions commingled. 
Although the Nazi party was supposed to take the lead in politics the State 
Chancellery even guided the propaganda issued by regional party offices 
(Schaarschmidt 2004, 163-6). However, Wahl, Mutschmann, and other Gaulei-
ter had limited control over the individual members of their cultural organiza-
tions. The Heimatwerk in Saxony was ultimately so bloated from assuming 
new responsibilities and absorbing new associations that its original political 
purpose was significantly diluted. In the end, the Heimatwerk created new 
avenues for dialectic social processes to take place at the regional level 
(Schaarschmidt 2004, 272-4). 
Aside from the domain of cultural policy, regional party leaders viewed the 
Four Year Plan (1936-1940) as an excellent opportunity for consolidating and 
expanding their position in Nazi Germany’s multi-level political system. It was 
no coincidence that Mutschmann subsequently declared the Heimatwerk in 
Saxony to be the state’s contribution to the Four Year Plan (Schaarschmidt 
2004, 175). In the autumn of 1936, Hermann Göring, who was the Plenipoten-
tiary of the Four Year Plan, called upon the Gauleiter to mobilize their party 
organizations for the purpose of rearmament (Der Vierjahresplan 1937/1, 35; see 
also Gruner 2011, 183). Following this call, a number of Gauleiter contacted the 
central office of the Four Year Plan to offer their support at the regional level. 
Fritz Sauckel, the Gauleiter of Thuringia, even went so far as to recommend 
the establishment of a regional branch of the Four Year Plan, including twelve 
specialized departments. Sauckel’s plan was symptomatic of the blurred line 
between state and party functions that occurred across all domains of politics 
and administration. The new institution was designed as a main office of the 
NSDAP at the Gau level (NSDAP-Gauhauptamt) with administrative func-
tions. It was necessary to assure “the closest possible collaboration between the 
state, private sector, and party offices” (John 2002, 46). For Sauckel, this had 
the welcome effect of enabling him to exert influence over the administrative 
district of Erfurt, which was part of the Gau Thuringia but belonged constitu-
tionally to Prussia. However, the overarching concern was to create a regional 
framework for coordinating the interests of government, business, and social 
actors, in order to realize the goals of the Four Year Plan. The Swabian Re-
gional Office for the Four Year Plan (Schwäbische Landesstelle Vier-
jahresplan), which was established by the Gauleiter Karl Wahl, served similar 
objectives, although it was to be subordinate to a new central office for the 
Four Year Plan housed within the Bavarian Ministry of Economics (Gotto 
2006, 158). 
Göring was late to realize the forces he had unleashed at the regional level 
with his call to mobilize led to a counterproductive dissipation of energy. In a 
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decree sent to the Gauleiter, Reich Governors, state governments, and Ober-
präsidenten dated February 15, 1937, he warned that the “formation of new 
offices [...] was generally more damaging than beneficial [...] as this often leads 
to frictions with the existing authorities,” thus reducing the “punch” of the Four 
Year Plan (Hartmannsgruber 2005, 115-7). This decree effectively put the 
brakes on regional party leaders’ efforts to create a second channel of influence 
alongside provincial and state-level administrative structures, which were in-
termeshed in a highly top-down hierarchy of control. Göring’s directive did not 
address what was to be done with the newly created organizational structures, 
yet it was abundantly clear that regional branch offices were made redundant 
when the central administrators of the Four Year Plan in Berlin refused to 
cooperate with them. 
A look at personnel policy during this period underscores the increasing 
freedom of action that the Gauleiter enjoyed at the regional level from the mid-
1930s onward. Hitler’s “Directive on the Appointment and Dismissal of Public 
Servants at the State Level” of February 1, 1935 stipulated that appointments 
were to be made by the Prussian Minister President within Prussia and by the 
Reich Interior Minister in the other states. However, this directive allowed 
these powers to be delegated to the Oberpräsidenten and Reich Governors, 
provided the Interior Minister gave his approval.3 This led to a situation in 
which the Gauleiter were increasingly able to hire and fire at will, without any 
real oversight by the party organization, as Wilhelm Frick complained to Ru-
dolph Hess in 1937 (Ruck 2011, 95). Frick warned that if the “Gauleiter are 
able to conduct their own personnel policy, then it will not be possible to 
achieve national unity in Germany’s civil service; rather, we will have public 
servants loyal to their Gau, and a new form of regional factionalism will take 
root” (Schrulle 2008, 76). 
Frick’s complaints ignored that the Reich Interior Ministry was at least par-
tially responsible for the institutional conflict that had resulted from its effort to 
implement reforms, which, rather than enhance cohesion toward a common 
aim, had in practice augmented the freedom of action enjoyed by the Reich 
Governors and Oberpräsidenten. Although the Gauleiter were not deliberately 
engaging in a “new form of particularism” (Schrulle 2008, 75; Ruck 2011, 103-
4), as Frick wrote, they did view themselves as “Viceroys of the Reich” 
(Noakes 2003, 118-52), responsible for mobilizing their states and provinces to 
further the ends of the Nazi regime. Indeed, the activities of the Gauleiter in 
numerous domains – including their implementation of radical anti-Jewish 
measures, their effort to conjoin the ideals of “blood and soil” with local tradi-
tion in order to create effective regional propaganda for the regime, and their 
support for the Four Year Plan through the mobilization of social and material 
                                                             
3  Reichsgesetzblatt 1935 I, 2.2.1935, 73. 
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resources – ultimately represented an effort to coordinate the central and mid-
dle levels of the Nazi regime. Yet there was no unified model for how this was 
to occur on a case-by-case basis.  
4.  New Models of Governance in the Multi-Level 
National Socialist System 
The differences between Germany’s states, provinces, and Gaue increased even 
further as the regime began conquering new territory (Krüger 1941, 143). Two 
factors were decisive in this regard: first, the establishment of the so-called 
Reichsgaue in newly annexed regions; and second, the differences between the 
Gauleiter who were appointed Reich Defense Commissioners in 1939 and 
those who were subordinate to them. Calls for the creation of Reichsgaue were 
made as early as 1938 by the Gauleiter of Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann. He was 
one of the Gauleiter who, in 1935, had taken advantage of the Second Reich 
Governor Act to assume control of the government of his state. In 1938, the 
Hamburg Senate was replaced by an administrative body under Kaufmann’s 
direct control. This administrative body viewed itself both as a mid-level 
organization within the Reich bureaucracy, as well as the legitimate representa-
tive of Hamburg. Like the Saxon Gauleiter, Kaufmann aimed at preventing 
central authorities from directly intervening in the affairs of individual depart-
ments of government at the state level; by bundling competencies, the Reich 
Governor was to be the representative to whom central authorities were re-
quired to turn when they sought to influence middle levels of government. 
However, in this attempt to control the impact of central authorities on Ham-
burg, Kaufmann was ultimately unsuccessful, both before and after the out-
break of the war (Lohalm 2005, 125-36; Ruck 2011, 91-2). 
The Reich Governors who oversaw post-Anschluss Austria and the areas of 
the Czech Republic and Poland that were annexed in 1938 and 1939 found 
themselves in a somewhat more favorable position. The Reich Interior Ministry 
spearheaded the passage of the Ostmarkgesetz and Sudetengaugesetz in April 
1939, which gave the new Reich Governors authority not only over the region-
al departments of government in their Gau, but also over the lower-level offic-
es of special administrative authorities (Sonderverwaltungen). However, this 
authority did not extend to the local offices of the Reich’s judicial, financial, 
transportation, postal, or police authorities (Gebel 1999, 104-8). 
The Reichsgaue were conceived as “autonomous regional entities” 
(Selbstverwaltungskörperschaften),4 thus engendering hopes among the new 
Reich Governors that they would enjoy considerable freedom of action. How-
                                                             
4  Reichsgesetzblatt 1939 I 74, 778 and 781. 
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ever, by investing itself with comprehensive authority over the Reich Gover-
nors, the Reich Interior Ministry aimed at making regional departments of 
government amenable to its centralized administrative control. In this way, the 
Reich Interior Ministry was pursuing the same goal in 1938 that it had in the 
mid-1930s (Gebel 1999, 98-9). In September 1938, State Secretary Wilhelm 
Stuckart complained that unclear organizational structures at the middle level 
of government were leading the Reich Governors to increasingly employ “the 
resources of party” in their effort to influence local administration. “As a result 
of this regrettable development,” Stuckart wrote, “ever greater frictions have 
arisen between the Reich Governors and the local heads of special administra-
tive authorities” (Gebel 1999, 104). 
This calculated ploy of the Reich Interior Ministry – that is, to expand the 
competencies of the Reichsgau, in order to increase its own authority – became 
even more apparent during the war. In 1941, appealing to Hitler’s decree of 
August 28, 1939 for the “Simplification of the Administration,”5 Stuckart now 
argued in a publication, on the occasion of Himmler’s 40th birthday, for the 
“far-reaching deconcentration and decentralization” of the bureaucracy. 
Stuckart asserted that responsibilities should be delegated to the greatest extent 
possible to the middle and lower levels of government in order to reduce the 
burdens placed on central administrative authorities. According to Stuckart, in 
order to mobilize all available resources, “flexible self-government, secured 
through a dedicated budget, is needed at the level of the Reichsgau in the areas 
of economics, social affairs, transportation, and culture” as a complement to a 
strong central authority (Stuckart 1941, 13). However, this reform proposal 
should not be viewed solely as a wartime “concession.” Rather, Stuckart ap-
pears to have been considering how the future European order would be orga-
nized under German leadership, for he notes the German Reich was “too ex-
pansive, its population too large, and its economy too diverse” to be effectively 
managed by a centralized authority (Stuckart 1941, 4-5). For Stuckart, strong 
central authority and self-government at the Gau level was “not contradictory”:  
Finding an organic synthesis between these two crucially important elements 
[...] is one of the most important tasks that will be undertaken as part of the 
political and administrative reorganization Reich. (Stuckart 1941, 5)  
He further added:  
All activities of a productive nature that do not fall legally under the purview 
of the Reich (i.e. the public sector of the Reich Governor and the special ad-
ministrative authorities) or the self-governance of the professional classes [...] 
should be subject in a unified fashion to self-government at the Gau level. 
(Stuckart 1941, 16)  
                                                             
5  Reichsgesetzblatt 1939 I 153, 1535-1537. 
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Michael Ruck’s notion “totalitarian subsidiarity principle” which he used in 
another context appears to be an exact description of Nazi governance, as out-
lined by Stuckart (Ruck 2011, 80). 
The ways in which the new Reichsgaue developed during the war largely 
depended on the relationship between the Reich Governors and HSSPF (Higher 
SS and Police Leaders). This relationship was most important in the Sudeten-
land and the Polish territories annexed in 1939, where the installation of German 
administrative structures went hand in hand with comprehensive ethnic cleans-
ing and resettlement policies. In each individual Reichgau, the Gauleiter and 
Reich Governors cultivated divergent relationships with Heinrich Himmler, 
who was Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood, 
and with the HSSPF. The Sudetenland was in a difficult situation structurally, 
as it was overseen by three HSSPF – in Nuremberg, Dresden, and Breslau 
(Gebel 1999, 114-5). By contrast, other Gauleiter, such as Arthur Greiser in 
Warthegau had an exceedingly cooperative relationship with the police and SS. 
As Himmler’s regional deputy for the Strengthening of German Nationhood 
Greiser was responsible for the issue of settlement policy, policy that was im-
plemented on a practical level by the HSSPF. There were close linkages at all 
levels of government between the newly installed government bureaucracy in 
Warthegau and the Sicherheitsdienst (the intelligence apparatus of the SS) 
(Pohl 2007, 402). However, in the Reichsgaue of Danzig-West Prussia and 
Upper Silesia, cooperation was less evident, as officials held divergent views 
on ethnic policy (Podranski 2008, 112-8). In any event, all of the newly created 
Reichsgaue were similar in that functions of the state and party were increas-
ingly commingled. Furthermore, the Reichsgaue gained a great deal of control 
over the central authorities’ regional departments, even more than in Austria 
and the Sudetenland (Pohl 2007, 398-401). 
By contrast, the competencies exercised by the original 32 Gaue did not ex-
pand significantly during the first years of war. In June of 1939, numerous 
Gauleiter were appointed as Evacuation Commissioners (Freimachungskom-
missare), in order to manage the evacuation of civilians from border regions in 
Western Germany (Klee 1999, 252). This appointment involved managing the 
coordination between the areas to be evacuated and the areas receiving dis-
placed persons (Fleischhauer 2010, 104-6). However, the importance of the 
Evacuation Commissioners increased dramatically from April 1942 onward, as 
the Allied bombing of German cities increased in intensity. A similar dynamic 
emerged with the Gauleiter who were appointed as Gau Housing Commission-
ers (Gauwohnungskommissare) following Robert Ley’s takeover of the office 
of Reich Commissioner for social housing. While Ley’s ambitious residential 
housing development plans were put on hold after the invasion of the USSR in 
June 1941, the regional Gau Housing Commissioners had to deal with the ever 
growing demand for temporary housing for bombed-out civilians (Harlander 
1995, 271). 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  233 
A key change that promoted differences between the individual Gaue was 
the appointment of 15 Reich Governors and Oberpräsidenten as Reich Defense 
Commissioners in 1939. Their key responsibility was “to bring civil defense 
measures in accordance with the needs of the German army.”6 Similar to the 
Reich Governors in the Reichsgaue, they were responsible for the “manage-
ment of all branches of the civilian bureaucracy” (with the exception of the 
Reich transportation, finance, and postal ministries). In this way, they were 
subordinate to the Reich Ministries, and subject to oversight by the Reich Inte-
rior Minister. While this appointment paid heed to the fact that the Reich Gov-
ernors in the original Gaue were of elementary importance for coordinating 
activities between the central and regional levels of government, it also created 
a new level of governing authority. As most of the Military Districts 
(Wehrkreise) were larger than the Gaue, many Gauleiter were automatically 
subordinate to the Reich Defense Commissioners. For example, the boundaries 
of Military District IX were such that eight other Gauleiter, including Jakob 
Sprenger and Adolf Wagner who themselves were Reich Defense Commis-
sioners of Military Districts XII and VII/XIII, were subject to the authority of 
Fritz Sauckel (Fleischhauer 2010, 138-9). 
While the appointment of individual Gauleiter as Reich Defense Commis-
sioners had limited practical significance in the early years of the war (Hütten-
berger 1969, 155), the Reich Defense Committees that supported their work 
proved to be an important forum for the coordination of measures critical to the 
war effort. According to a directive issued by the Ministerial Council for the 
Defense of the Reich on September 22, 1939, the committees had the function 
of “advising the Reich Defense Commissioner and supporting him to ensure 
coordinated management of the civil defense of the Reich within the Military 
District.”7 The Reich Defense Committees were composed of the Reich Gover-
nors, Gauleiter, and Oberpräsidenten of the individual Military Districts, in 
addition to District Presidents, Minister Presidents, State Ministers, Higher SS 
and Police Leaders, Presidents of the Regional Employment Offices, Trustees 
of Labor (Reichstreuhänder der Arbeit), and any additional persons appointed 
by the Reich Defense Commissioners. In this way, a new consultative organ 
with governance functions was installed alongside the existing, hierarchically 
organized administrative structures. This organ brought together the most im-
portant regional officials within the Gau. However, not all of the Reich De-
fense Commissioners made equal use of the regional Committees in performing 
their work (Brinkhus 2010, 16-7, 145-6). 
                                                             
6  Reichsgesetzblatt 1939 I 158, 1565 et seq. 
7  Reichsgesetzblatt 1942 I 190, 1937. 
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5.  Total War and Improvised Decentralization  
With the outbreak of the war and the mobilization of the population in support 
of the war effort, the authority of the Gauleiter increased significantly. However, 
the decentralization sought by the Reich Interior Ministry did not get underway 
until the second half of the war. A decisive step was the November 1942 re-
form of the Military Districts undertaken to make their borders contiguous with 
the borders of the Gaue.8 This reform was accompanied by the naming of all 
Gauleiter as Reich Defense Commissioners. As a consequence of the reform, 
the Gaue became the most important spatial units within the Reich. It was no 
coincidence that this decision was made at a time when the political leadership 
began to realize that the mere continuation of the war would necessitate the 
mobilization of all available human and material resources. The responsibility 
for this total mobilization fell predominantly on the shoulders of the Reich 
Defense Commissioners, who were already struggling with the aerial bom-
bardment of German cities. 
At the same time, from early 1942 onward Albert Speer sought to unite at 
the regional level all authorities involved in armaments production, and to 
obligate them to cooperate with his ministry. The party leadership made a 
deliberate decision to keep the regional organs of the Armaments Ministry 
separate from the responsibilities exercised by the Reich Governors. Speer 
created regional armament commissions (Rüstungskommissionen), which were 
responsible for coordinating all actors involved in armaments production at the 
regional level. The commissions were composed of armaments inspectors, the 
Armament Ministry’s commissioners for the military district, the heads of the 
armaments committees and rings, the director of the state employment offices, 
the Gau economic advisors, the president of the Gau chambers of commerce, 
and the Gau-level heads of the German Labor Front (Werner 2013, 219-20). A 
territorial reform of the armament commissions to make them contiguous with 
the Gaue did not take place until August 1944. As part of this reform, arma-
ment subcommittees were created in the Gaue that did not yet have an arma-
ments committee.9  
The armaments committees were established to coordinate weapons produc-
tion activities. Yet they were also a management tool, designed to enable top-
down control of armaments issues. The importance of this control function was 
particularly evident in Speer’s conflicts with the Reich Defense Commission-
ers. Common flash points included the shutting down of existing production 
facilities, as well as centralized intervention to reassign workers. When dis-
                                                             
8  Reichsgesetzblatt 1942 I 117, 649-56. 
9  NSDAP Partei-Kanzlei: Rundschreiben 173/44. Betr.: Verstärkter Einsatz der Gauleiter für die 
Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion, 1.8.1944 (BArchB, NS 6/347, 38-42). 
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putes arose, the armaments committees served as a forum for reconciling dif-
ferences between regional interests, and demands formulated at the central 
level (Werner 2013, 221-5; Ruck 2011, 100). While the Gauleiter could some-
times influence committee decisions thanks to the close ties they enjoyed to 
their Gau Economic Advisors (Gauwirtschaftsberater), in general “mid-level 
organs of government were required to simply accept” centralized control by 
the Ministry of Armaments, as Party Secretary Martin Bormann wrote in Au-
gust 1944.10 
This assertion of central government primacy was necessary, for in their 
function as Reich Defense Commissioners, the Gauleiter were invested with 
greatly expanded authority over the armaments economy. For example, imme-
diately following his appointment as General Plenipotentiary for the Employ-
ment of Labor in March 1942, Fritz Sauckel appointed his fellow Gauleiter as 
regional representatives (Nolzen 2008, 184-5). Gauleiter authority underwent 
an additional expansion in August 1944, when Joseph Goebbels was named 
Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War. In this position he granted the Gauleiter 
wide-ranging powers for mobilizing the home front (Ruck 2011, 102). 
At one of the last Gauleiter and Reichsleiter Conferences, held on August 3, 
1944 at the Royal Palace in Posen, Goebbels invoked the revolutionary spirit of 
the years prior to 1933 and called upon the Gauleiter to recruit one million men 
so that 100 new army divisions could be formed. This manpower was to be 
obtained by streamlining the bureaucracy while also reducing the personnel 
involved in armaments production (Heiber 1991, 360-404). While Wilhelm 
Stuckart complained in 1938 that lack of proper authority was forcing the 
Reich Governors to leverage their positions as party officials to influence the 
workings of government, by 1944 mass mobilization by party officials invested 
with new, wide-ranging powers was now seen as the only means of avoiding 
defeat in the war. In this way, the Nazi leadership hoped that the improvisa-
tional and leadership talents of the Gauleiter could be harnessed to restore 
flagging moral on the home front and free up new resources, thus enabling a 
continuation of the war (Heiber 1991, 387, 400). 
While Goebbels’ demand for Gauleiter-led intervention into the labor force 
led to inescapable conflict with the Ministry of Armaments and the Wehrmacht 
leadership (Werner 2013, 230-1; Fleischhauer 2010, 290-1), much of the Gau-
leiters’ influence resulted from the successful coordination of regional actors. 
Following the devastating aerial bombardment of Rostock in April 1942, the 
Gauleiter of Mecklenburg, Friedrich Hildebrandt, formed a special commission 
that served as a model for other cities and regions threatened by air attack 
(Buddrus 2009, 378). The special commissions at the Gau level, known as 
Gaueinsatzstäbe, played an instrumental role in dealing with the effects of 
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Allied bombing and stabilizing the home front. Shoring up the home front was 
of elementary importance for the Nazi leadership, for after Stalingrad, there 
were tremendous fears that military setbacks would erode support for the war 
and force premature armistice, much like the “stab in the back” that allegedly 
caused Germany to lose the First World War. 
Similar to the Reich Defense Committees and Armaments Commissions es-
tablished by Albert Speer, the Gaueinsatzstäbe created forums for the informal 
coordination of state and party officials, municipal representatives, military 
leaders, and important companies. They complied with the expectation that 
improvised pragmatic solutions were essential for coming to grips with the 
increasingly dire exigencies of war. While the overarching aim of the reforms 
undertaken in the latter years of the war was to strengthen executive authority, 
the establishment of various bodies for coordination at the regional level ulti-
mately reflected the desire to couple centralized control with dynamic and 
vigorous collaboration at the mid-level rungs of government, as Stuckart had 
called for in 1941 (Stuckart 1941, 17). In the end, it was irrelevant whether the 
Gauleiter, mayors or other government officials were in charge of running the 
Gaueinsatzstäbe (Brinkhus 2010, 155-6). 
Following the shock of the devastating firebombing of Hamburg in July 
1943, Kaufmann established a special form of cooperation between the party, 
municipal bureaucracy, and economic enterprises in his Reichsgau. The city 
was subdivided into 18 sectors, and the companies located in each sector were 
made collectively responsible for managing reconstruction and caring for 
bombed-out workers (Lohalm 2005, 151-2). This pragmatic solution was a 
necessary stopgap measure, as normal government mechanisms had collapsed 
in the chaos of the bombing and its aftermath. However the Hamburg model 
ran contrary to the desires of Albert Speer, who sought to exercise direct con-
trol over industry through the Armaments Commissions, yet as an ad hoc form 
of governance it successfully harnessed all resources in the city, enabling ar-
maments production to make a dramatic recovery within just a few months. 
Concomitant with their “horizontal” mobilization efforts, the Gauleiter in 
areas of West Germany that were particularly threatened by aerial bombard-
ment sought to obtain direct access to Hitler – thus circumventing the normal 
power hierarchy, in an example of “scale jumping” – in order to impress upon 
him the need to construct more bomb shelters and evacuate civilians deemed 
unnecessary for the war economy (Brinkhus 2010, 156-7). As supply bottle-
necks for consumer goods became increasingly dire over the course of the war, 
municipal authorities availed themselves of existing “vertical networks” – 
while simultaneously circumventing official channels – in order to obtain 
scarce goods directly from producers and assuage discontent on the home front 
(Gotto 2006, 334-5). “The personalized and feudalistic administrative structure 
of the Nazi state didn’t just give rise to polycratic structures,” Bernhard Gotto 
writes in his work on the municipal bureaucracy of Augsburg. “In the regional 
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environment of an organizational culture dependent on cooperation, they 
served in an equal measure as a sort of dialectic antidote to administrative 
conflicts” (Gotto 2006, 342-3). 
The structures of power at the regional level underwent considerable change 
in the final two years of the war. This change, fueled in part by the two-
pronged goal of encouraging greater decentralization and streamlined bureau-
cratic structures, led the middle level of governance to gradually take on a 
significantly different status within the overall system of the Nazi state. The 
moratorium Hitler imposed on all structural reforms until the end of the war did 
little to slow this regional transformation. As early as 1941, the Gauleiter of 
Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann, was calling for the Reichsgau model which became 
predominant in the annexed territories to be adopted in the pre-1939 Gaue 
(Lohalm 2005, 136). In 1942, the Gauleiter of Saxony, Martin Mutschmann, 
complained to the head of the Reich Chancellery, Hans Heinrich Lammers, that 
the Reich Ministries were acting to expand the powers of the District Presiden-
cies (Regierungspräsidien) in order to enhance centralized control (Wagner 
2002, 54). Mutschmann was not alone in this view. Indeed, in subsequent 
months, numerous Gauleiter sought to curb or otherwise employ the admin-
istration of the District Presidents (Heiber 1992). The situation in the Prussian 
provinces was particularly demonstrative of the latter case (Brinkhus 2010, 
153; Schrulle 2008, 200), following Hitler’s approval for the creation of the 
Reichsgau of Danzig-West Prussia “as a test case” (Heiber 1992). 
Parallel to these developments, throughout 1943 all states and Gaue, with 
the exception of Prussia and Bavaria, witnessed a movement toward the crea-
tion of “unitary authorities” (Einheitsbehörden), in which formerly separate 
departments of the bureaucracy were merged, a solution that had been favored 
by the Reich Interior Ministry even prior to the war. However, the upper lead-
ership in Berlin had very little control over how these unitary authorities were 
structured. Some of them were created by combining the State Chancellery 
Offices or the State Ministries with specialized departments. In other cases, 
they were formed by consolidating all ministerial employees under the over-
sight of the Minister President (Heiber 1992). In Hamburg, the Gauleiter Karl 
Kaufmann established in August 1943 seven general commissioners for the 
various branches of the bureaucracy. These commissioners were recruited from 
among the ranks of the city’s most important political leaders. Thus, the mayor 
of Hamburg, Carl Vincent Krogmann, was put in charge of the bureaucracy; 
the Higher SS and Police Leader Georg-Henning Graf von Bassewitz-Behr 
headed the security apparatus, and the Gau Economics Advisor Otto Wolff was 
made responsible for the economy (Lohalm 2005, 137). Kaufmann summarized 
his successes in February 1944: “In Hamburg, the functions of Gauleiter, mayor, 
director of the state bureaucracy, Reich Defense Commissioner, and Gau Hous-
ing Commissioner are united in one hand – in the hand of the Gauleiter” (Lo-
halm 2005, 138). 
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The protests lodged by the Reich Interior Ministry against the solution that 
was adopted in Hamburg had no practical impact. Similarly, the disapproval 
voiced by Hitler concerning the unauthorized formation of a unitary authority 
in Saxony fell on deaf ears (Heiber 1992). Like in Hamburg, all authority in 
Saxony was consolidated in the hand of the Gauleiter Martin Mutschmann. 
However, in contrast to Kaufmann, Mutschmann appointed subaltern ministeri-
al officials who were personally dependent on him to head up the individual 
departments of the unitary authority.11 When the Reich Interior Minister called 
for a well qualified public servant to be installed as head of the unitary authori-
ty, and also insisted that the State Ministries and State Chancellery be dis-
solved, his demands went unheeded (Heiber 1992). 
As had been called for by Wilhelm Stuckart in 1941, “de-concentration and 
de-centralization” took place on a large scale during the final two years of the 
war in both the old and newly occupied territories of the Reich (Stuckart 1941, 
5). The Reich Governors and Oberpräsidenten were the authorities responsible 
for assuring all regions’ resources were mobilized to the greatest extent possi-
ble for the war effort, as Stuckart had envisioned (Stuckart 1941, 5, 13). While 
the expanded powers of the Gauleiter led to counterproductive frictions with 
Himmler and other central authorities such as the Armaments Ministry, this did 
have positive effects for the maintenance of the regime, as the Gauleiter used 
their expanded authority to assuage the suffering of the civilian population and 
keep armaments production at the highest possible level. The fact that the Gaue 
functioned as “autonomous regional entities” (Selbstverwaltungskörperschaf-
ten) on behalf of the Reich (Stuckart 1941, 8) saved Nazi Germany’s multi-
level governance system from complete collapse in the final phase of the war, 
when continuous communication between the system’s different levels was no 
longer possible.  
6.  The Fatal Consequences of Multi-Level Governance in 
Nazi Germany 
To understand the structure and function of the Nazi state, it is necessary to 
consider how institutions and actors at various levels of the political system 
interacted. Yet these interactions cannot be understood simply by examining 
organizational charts. Rather, it is crucial to examine institutional dynamics at 
the micro-level, to illuminate interactions between individual actors and the 
outcomes they generated. Although Germany’s political leaders sought to usher 
in an increasingly centralized system of government after its first constitutional 
                                                             
11  See Udo von Woyrsch (HSSPF Elbe) to Heinrich Himmler, 24.9.1943 (BArchB, NS 19/51, 3 et 
seq.). 
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reforms in 1933, they had no choice but to adopt a functional equivalent to the 
existing federal system. The practical challenges associated with effective 
centralized administration of the vast and diverse territory of the Reich were 
simply too large. Yet there was no overarching plan for how the Reich was to 
be ruled; rather, there was a gamut of different concepts and approaches, none 
of which achieved preeminence. 
In real-world practice, this led to a situation in which the old federal struc-
tures continued to exist, but were imbued with new responsibilities. At the 
same time, newly created regional institutions and actors, such as the Reich 
Governors, strove to consolidate as much influence as possible, and the road to 
greater influence was for regional actors to position themselves as both loyal 
and indispensable. This interaction generated a new multi-level system that was 
even more disparate in its structure than the federal system that existed prior to 
1918 or during the Weimar Republic. 
Far from being a well-ordered state with clear hierarchies and lines of au-
thority, the Nazi system was more akin to an untended garden in which new 
growth had run rampant. However, if one does not judge the system according 
to its adoption of clear hierarchies, but rather according to its ability to cope 
with the demands of total war, then the flexible structures that took hold at the 
regional level are cast in a new light, as their usefulness becomes apparent 
(Ruck 2011, 78). In the speech he gave to the Gauleiter and the Reichsleiter in 
Posen on August 3, 1944, Goebbels intentionally spoke of the need for a gov-
ernment structure with a singular purpose – namely, to ensure “in a short period 
of time, and in improvised fashion, an extraordinarily effective mode of leader-
ship and mobilization for war [without the need for] a large bureaucratic appa-
ratus” (Heiber 1991, 387). This vision had already been achieved to a large 
extent at the regional level by August of 1944. 
A key element of the “improvisation” invoked by Goebbels was the need to 
rapidly integrate and coordinate various political and social actors in coopera-
tive structures that would be temporary in nature. This form of governance 
allowed all available human resources at the regional level to be mobilized for 
the war effort, regardless of whether the individuals to be mobilized were party 
officials, military officers, municipal bureaucrats, or local business leaders. In 
this way, the dysfunctional aspects of the polycratic system could be ameliorated 
(Nolzen 2012, 260). In any event, this situation-specific, pragmatic pooling of 
various actors and interests was no less a fundamental feature of Nazi govern-
ance than the continuous emergence of new power structures at the national 
and regional levels (Hachtmann 2011, 29-73). Thus, even while the NSDAP 
maintained its claim to absolute authority until the spring of 1945, diverse 
forms of governance within the individual Gaue and the practice of “scale 
jumping” must be recognized as integral components of National Socialist rule, 
particularly in the latter half of the war. 
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